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The Globalization of Tax Expenditure Reporting:  
Transplanting Transparency in India and the Global South 
Lisa Philipps© 
I. Introduction 
This chapter traces the rise of tax expenditure reporting in countries of the Global South, with a 
particular focus on India. It investigates why and how policy makers in some low and middle income 
countries are now moving to adopt a budgeting practice that originated in wealthy Western nations in the 
1970s. I discuss the potential advantages of this trend, but also argue that there is a need for its champions 
to face up to some challenges and potential disadvantages of transplanting this form of fiscal transparency 
into different national contexts. These include methodological and political challenges that are well 
known to Western observers but are seldom fully acknowledged in the literature advocating adoption of 
tax expenditure reporting by developing countries. In addition, the chapter questions whether generic 
prescriptions are sufficiently attuned to local political, economic and institutional circumstances that may 
diminish the value of OECD-style tax expenditure reporting to receiving countries.  
Part II briefly reviews the history of tax expenditure analysis since the late 1960s and then charts 
the more recent campaign to encourage its implementation by developing countries. The analysis shows 
that international organizations, Western commentators, and domestic tax policy experts have all 
contributed to this campaign. Advocates have tended to rely on two main types of rationale. The first is 
technocratic, stressing the value of tax expenditure reporting to government policy makers seeking to 
craft a more efficient, equitable and administratively simple tax system which raises maximum revenues 
to finance state priorities. The second focuses more on democratic governance and the role of 
transparency in securing accountability for the allocation of public resources and distribution of tax 
burdens. Part II concludes by reviewing the evidence that there is indeed a modest trend toward the 
globalization of tax expenditure reporting.  
Part III offers a case study of India’s experience leading up to the publication of its first tax 
expenditure report in 2006 and how this report has developed through several budget cycles. The case 
study shows that a mix of internal and external influences were at play in bringing this budget document 
to India. It also compares the Indian report to Canada’s tax expenditure report and finds that the Indian 
exercise is more robust from both technocratic and democratic perspectives. Part III highlights both the 
potential benefits of tax expenditure reporting in India and its limits. While the tax expenditure report 
provides new and valuable information and analysis, there are significant political and institutional 
barriers to translating this knowledge into significant tax reforms.  
In Part IV, I suggest several reasons why foreign experts and international organizations ought to 
choose our words carefully in recommending tax expenditure analysis to countries of the Global South. 
Law and development literature has documented the problems that can arise when institutional reform 
prescriptions are not sufficiently contextualized to local politics, economies and culture. I argue that these 
concerns apply with equal force to the quest for universal tax expenditure reporting. At a minimum, 
advocates should openly acknowledge that tax expenditure analysis remains contested and has limited 
political purchase in the OECD countries usually held out as models of best practice. Caution is also 
needed to ensure that normative biases about ideal tax policy are not smuggled in through an ostensibly 
technocratic exercise in transparency, thereby distorting or sidestepping the domestic policy making 
processes of the receiving country. Finally, before investing scarce administrative resources in a particular 
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model of tax expenditure reporting developing countries should be encouraged to weigh its potential 
benefits and costs, including the opportunity costs of foregoing other possible activities of finance and 
revenue personnel. I argue that without an explicit strategy for naming, analyzing and tackling these 
challenges as they arise in context, tax expenditure reporting is even less likely to impact positively on 
either policy formation or democratic accountability than in the high income countries where it was first 
established.  
Part V concludes by summarizing the potential benefits but also the likely limitations and costs of 
tax expenditure reporting as a development strategy.  
II. Tax Expenditure Reporting: From U.S. Origins to Global Relevance
Since the late 1960s tax policy analysts in the US and other industrialized countries have drawn 
an analytical distinction between on the one hand the normal or technical rules of a tax which are 
designed to raise revenues in an equitable and efficient manner, and on the other the special concessions 
or targeted exceptions from the normal rules which are designed to achieve other economic or social 
policy goals of government. Stanley Surrey, as Harvard Professor and Assistant Secretary to the US 
Treasury, famously coined the term “tax expenditures” to describe this second dimension of a tax system 
and to make the point that these exceptional provisions should be understood not as tax rules at all but as 
indirect spending programs.1 When governments wish to address market failures or stimulate changes in 
economic or social behavior, they can choose from a suite of policy instruments including soft or hard 
regulation, direct service provision, money transfers, or tax measures.2
Tax expenditure reporting is the remedy that Surrey prescribed to address the transparency 
problems created by delivering spending programs indirectly through the tax system. Accountability of 
government institutions for the expenditure of public funds is typically identified as a basic requirement 
of the rule of law.
 Surrey argued that deciding to tax 
a particular group or economic activity more lightly than others in order to achieve such goals is 
financially equivalent to providing a direct grant to the taxpayers who benefit. Thus, they should be 
designed and evaluated with the same care as direct spending programs.  
3 Thus information about the objectives, cost, target effectiveness, and distributional 
impact of any public spending program in principle should be available for review by democratic 
institutions of the state and civil society. However tax expenditures often escape this type of scrutiny 
because they are embedded within highly technical provisions of a tax law that generally need never be 
re-approved once enacted. Over time, these preferences and deviations from the normal tax system can 
come to be seen as part of a complex revenue raising structure rather than spending programs which 
should be costed and reviewed like any other government expenditure. Surrey’s proposed solution to 
counteract this relative invisibility was to embed tax expenditure reporting within the budgetary process. 
That is, the budget should include information about the foregone revenues and other impacts associated 
with tax expenditures to facilitate cost-benefit analysis of individual measures and trade-offs with other 
uses of public money. In addition to improving transparency about the total spending budget, Surrey 
hoped that exposing the inequities, inefficiencies and administrative complexities of tax expenditures 
would provide impetus for base-broadening tax reforms.4
1 See Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (Harvard University Press, 
1973); and Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (Harvard University Press, 1985). The history 
of Surrey’s work through the late 1960s and 1970s, much of it with Professor Paul McDaniel, is reviewed in J. 
Clifton Fleming Jr. and Robert J. Peroni, ‘Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and its International Dimension’ 
27 Virginia Tax Review 437 (2008), 439-441.  
  
2 See Surrey, Ibid., 3; and Surrey and McDaniel, Ibid, 25-26.  
3 See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock and Ronald J. Daniels, Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the 
Fragile Path of Progress (Edward Elgar, 2008), 32. 
4 United States, Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, A Reconsideration of Tax Expenditure Analysis, JCX-37-
08 (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 12, 2008), 2-3. See also Surrey, supra n. 1, 30-33.  
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Under Surrey’s influence the US government began publishing tax expenditure data in 1968.5 
Since then the basic principles and ideals of tax expenditure analysis have been accepted by many 
Western tax policy analysts inside and outside government and by international bodies that are influential 
in developing fiscal policy norms (as discussed further below). Tax expenditure reporting is a well 
established practice in many OECD countries, some of which require it by law.6 It also has fierce critics. 
Especially in the US, an entrenched debate persists about the basic coherence of the concept and whether 
it is possible in a clear and principled way to distinguish the normative tax system of a country from the 
exceptions to it. Surrey and McDaniel defined their benchmark tax in relation to the Schanz-Haig-Simons 
concept of economic income as the sum of the value of a person’s consumption plus the change in their 
net wealth over a period of time. 7 Some critics have rejected their choice of benchmark as a thinly veiled 
political agenda to reform the tax system in accordance with a particular model, while others argue that it 
is too vague to resolve the classification of many provisions.8 In a recent comparative study of OECD 
countries Christopher Heady noted there is in fact significant variation among countries in the choice of 
benchmarks.9 Beyond this fundamental definitional question other controversies abound over how to 
measure the costs, distributional impacts, and behavioural effects of tax expenditures, and whether 
estimates of revenue foregone from tax expenditures are so uncertain and contingent that they are more 
likely to mislead than to enlighten the public.10
Despite these ongoing debates, many tax commentators accept the basic principles and ideals of 
tax expenditure analysis. Their most frequent lament is that it has had such limited impact on policy 
making in OECD countries. Academic scholars and other budget analysts have frequently complained 
about the lack of depth and detail in tax expenditure reports, the failure of policy makers to integrate tax 
expenditure analysis fully into budgetary decision making or tax law design, and the rapid growth of tax 
expenditures in number and cost despite the availability of information about them.
  
11
5 United States Treasury, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Fiscal 
Year ended June 30, 1969 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 330, available as of February 12, 2012, at 
http://www.archive.org/details/annualreportofse1969statiunit. 
 These and other 
problems led the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation of the U.S. Congress to conclude in 2008 that 
6 See, e.g., Australia’s Charter of Budget Honesty Act, 1998, pt. 5, div. 1, s.12(1)(d), and the U.S. Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act 1974. See also OECD, Tax Expenditures in OECD Countries (OECD, 2010); 
OECD, Tax Expenditures: Recent Experiences (OECD, 1996); and OECD, Tax Expenditures: A Review of Issues 
and Country Practices (OECD, 1984). 
7 Henry Simons, Personal Income Taxation: the Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy (University of 
Chicago Press, 1938).  
8 See Boris I. Bittker, ‘A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform’ 80:5 Harvard Law Review 
925 (1967), and ‘Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget’ 22:2 National Tax Journal 244-
261 (1969).  
9 Christopher Heady, ‘Tax Expenditures: Definitional and Policy Issues,’ in Lisa Philipps, Neil Brooks, and Jinyan 
Li, eds., Tax Expenditure Analysis: State of the Art (Canadian Tax Foundation, 2011).  
10 Paul McDaniel recently reviewed and responded to these criticisms in ‘The Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation Revision of Tax Expenditure Classification Methodology: What Is To Be Made of a Change That Makes 
No Changes?’ in Lisa Philipps, Neil Brooks, and Jinyan Li, Ibid. Ch. 3. For a revealing discussion of how debate 
over the benchmark has undermined the political effectiveness of tax expenditure analysis, see Victor Thuronyi, 
‘Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment’ Duke Law Journal  1155 (1988). For a thorough discussion of the critiques and 
a response in defense of tax expenditure analysis, see Fleming and Peroni, supra n. 1, 487-525.  
11 Some recent examples include Robin Boadway, ‘The Annual Tax Expenditure Reports—A Critique’ 55:1 
Canadian Tax Journal 106 (2007); Mark Burton, ‘Making the Australian Tax Expenditures Statement an Effective 
Policy Instrument: From Fiscal Record to Transparent Report’ 8 (1) Australian Journal of Taxation 1(2005); 
Edward Kleinbard, ‘The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our 
Political Processes’ 36 Ohio Northern Law Review 1 (2010); and Emil Sunley, ‘Tax Expenditures in the United 
States: Experience and Practice,’ in Hana Polackova Brixi, Christian M.A. Valenduc, and Zhicheng Li Swift, eds., 
Tax Expenditures—Shedding Light on Government Spending Through the Tax System: Lessons from Developed and 
Transition Economies (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2004), 155.  
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“Surrey’s original hope that tax expenditure analysis would have a salutary effect on budget transparency 
(and through that, on actual budget outlays) has not been realized…”.12
Similar disappointments have been expressed by leading international organizations, which have 
served as key interlocutors in the effort to globalize tax expenditure analysis. First among these is the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), widely recognized as the dominant 
player in the formation of global tax policy norms.
  
13
Accounting in many countries suggests that the use of tax expenditures is pervasive and 
growing…At any time, the possibility that a back channel for resource allocation could lead to 
inefficient government “spending” would be troubling. When many government budgets are 
threatened by population ageing and adverse cyclical developments [i.e. deficits], the concern is 
only greater.
 The OECD has been critical of the proliferation of 
tax expenditures based on its view that the most efficient tax system in a market economy has a broad 
base and low rates applied neutrally to different forms of income or economic activity. It has reiterated 
this concern recently: 
14
The OECD has accordingly sought to encourage critical analysis of tax concessions at the country 
level. For example, its Best Practices for Budget Transparency provides that “[t]he estimated cost of key 
tax expenditures should be disclosed as supplementary information in the budget…in order to inform 
budgetary choices”.15 Importantly, it does not limit its advocacy to OECD countries. Rather, the Best 
Practices are explicitly designed as a “reference tool for Member and non-Member countries.”16
 Both the IMF and the World Bank have reinforced the OECD’s message and directed it more 
pointedly at low and middle income countries. Both of these bodies have more power than the OECD to 
intervene and produce policy change at the country level, for example through loan conditionality, 
surveillance reporting, and provision of technical assistance to design and implement reforms. The IMF’s 
Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency says that every country’s budget should disclose “the 
nature and fiscal significance of central government tax expenditures.”
 Thus the 
OECD promotes tax expenditure reporting as a universal good. I describe its approach as technocratic 
because it focuses on assisting government actors to make better policy, as measured against the OECD’s 
standards of an ideal tax system.  
17 The IMF publishes reports (the 
so-called “Fiscal ROSCs”) on individual countries’ compliance with this Code. 18 The importance of 
presenting tax expenditure estimates to Parliament, “preferably as part of annual budget documentation” 
was reiterated recently in a Technical Guidance Note prepared by IMF staff.19
Policy analysts have elaborated several rationales for advocating that lower income and transition 
countries embrace the kinds of tax expenditure reporting practiced in high income countries. These 
include a mix of technocratic arguments aimed at policy makers, and more accountability-oriented 
rationales that speak to democratic governance of the budget process in developing countries. Thus World 
Bank analyst Schiavo-Campo warns that concessions granted through tax laws “are not submitted to the 
same system of internal control and legislative authorization as other expenditures,” and that tax 
 
12 Supra note 4. 
13 For a detailed discussion of the OECD’s leadership role in international tax policy standard setting, see Allison 
Christians, ‘Networks, Norms and National Tax Policy’ Wash. U. Global Studies Law Review (2010). 
14 Tax Expenditures in OECD Countries, supra n. 6, 14. 
15 OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency (OECD, May 15, 2001), s.2.2.  
16 Ibid., s.4. 
17 (IMF 2007), s.3.13. 
18 The Fiscal ROSCs published to date can be viewed on the IMF’s Fiscal Transparency webpage: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp?sort=topic#FiscalTransparency. For a full discussion of the IMF’s 
limited vision of budget transparency, see Lisa Philipps and Miranda Stewart, ‘Fiscal Transparency: Global Norms, 
Domestic Laws, and the Politics of Budgets’ 34:3 Brooklyn Journal of International  Law 797 (2009).  
19 Ian Lienert, ‘Role of the Legislature in Budget Processes’ (IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, April 2010), 13, 
available as of February 12, 2012, at http://blog-pfm.imf.org/files/fad-technical-manual-9.pdf. 
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expenditure reporting “enhances legislative scrutiny of government policy”.20 This scrutiny is in turn 
expected to improve the quality of tax policy because it will expose the ineffective, inefficient and 
inequitable character of many tax expenditures. It could reveal, for example, that “high-income 
households can benefit more than needier households from tax credits” and that the latter group would be 
better served by “family allowances targeted to low-income groups.”21 Other commentators have linked 
the rise of tax incentives to problems of corruption and abuse of power in developing countries. Li Swift 
for example argues that tax incentives often create avenues for avoidance or evasion by wealthier 
taxpayers and for discretion-wielding officials to favour powerful interests.22 This connects to a larger 
concern about erosion of the state’s capacity to raise revenues to finance development projects directly. 
For example a study of Poland’s budget provided data to show that the “cost of tax expenditure programs 
… has grown much faster than direct spending programs”.23
…with limited theoretical understanding of, and ad hoc experience with, applying tax
expenditures, developing countries now confront not only revenue losses higher than they had 
anticipated but also the erosion of their tax bases in systems that generally have been in existence 
fewer than 10 years.
 Tax expenditure reporting is presented as a 
way to counteract this alarming trend: 
24
Liberal use of tax incentives is blamed for “reducing these countries’ capacity to assist the needs of the 
poor”.25
Tax incentives for foreign investors and domestic industry have been particularly singled out by 
some commentators. For example Richard Krever has provided a strong critique of corporate income tax 
incentives in Mongolia and recommended that its government implement tax expenditure analysis as part 
of its policy making process.
 Heavier scrutiny of tax expenditures is therefore recommended as part of a strategy to mobilize 
revenues for development spending in the interests of less powerful sectors of society.  
26 In previous work Miranda Stewart and I have made a similar argument that 
promoting transparency about not only the costs but the distributive impact of investment tax incentives 
could foster democratic debate about tax policy at the country level and build domestic support for base-
broadening reforms.27
At least one high profile NGO has also been active in calling on developing countries to publicize 
information about their use of tax expenditures. In 2006 the International Budget Project (IBP), an arm of 
the Washington-based Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities, launched its Open Budget Index, an 
evaluation and ranking of the degree of budget transparency in low and middle income countries. One of 
the many factors which forms the basis for the ranking is whether a country’s budget documentation 
  
20 Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, ‘The Budget and Its Coverage,’ in Anwar Shah, ed., Budgeting and Budgetary 
Institutions (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2007) 53, 81.  
21 Ibid. See also Zhicheng Li Swift, Hana Polackova Brixi, and Christian Vanenduc, ‘Tax Expenditures: General 
Concept, Measurement and Overview of Country Practices,’ in Hana Polackova Brixi, Christian M.A. Valenduc, 
and Zhicheng Li Swift, eds., Supra note 11, 5.  
22 Zhicheng Li Swift, ‘Managing the Effects of Tax Expenditures on National Budgets,’ World Bank Policy 
Research Paper 3927, May 2006, 11-13, available as of February 12, 2012, at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/05/23/000016406_20060523092056/Rendered/P
DF/wps3927.pdf. Academic scholar Wilson Prichard has similarly argued that non-transparent tax expenditures fuel 
corruption in developing countries. See Wilson Prichard, ‘Taxation and State Building: Towards a Governance 
Focused Tax Reform Agenda’ (Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Working Paper 2010: 341), 
33-34.  
23 Carlos B. Cavalcanti and Zhicheng Li Swift, ‘Poland: Reforming Tax Expenditure Programs,’ in Brixi, Valenduc, 
and Li Swift, supra note 11, 211.  
24 Ibid., 1.  
25 Ibid., 2.  
26 Richard Krever, Reform of the Mongolian Corporate Income Tax (Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), for the 
USAID-financed Economic Policy Support Project, September 24, 2003), 12-14. 
27 Philipps and Stewart, supra note 18, 841-842. 
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includes information on tax expenditures, and if so the quality of that information.28 The IBP’s stated 
reasons for advocating greater fiscal transparency are heavily focused on democratic governance rather 
than bringing domestic policy into line with particular OECD standards. Instead, the IBP seeks to 
empower civil society groups inside and outside a country to question how public funds are being used 
and to apply political pressure for changes they believe are needed. A recent report by Burton and Stewart 
for the IBP discusses concrete ways that civil society advocates can use a tax expenditure report 
effectively in order to hold governments accountable for budgetary decisions.29 Constituencies may make 
different uses of available information depending on their priority issues, such as redressing poverty, 
fighting corruption, making government spending more efficient, ensuring foreign aid is used for its 
intended purposes, de-financing parties to a violent conflict, or improving environmental practices.30
It is difficult to quantify the practical effect of expert discourses such as those discussed above. 
However, it does appear that tax expenditure reporting has gained some traction in some low and middle 
income countries in the early part of the 21st century. Based on data gathered by the OECD from 2007-09, 
50 per cent of OECD member countries provided a “comprehensive table of tax expenditures” in their 
budget documents, while the same was true of 30 per cent of non-member countries surveyed.
  
31 Further, 
between 2006 and 2008, the International Budget Project reported improved scores on tax expenditure 
reporting for 8 low or middle income countries, while only one country had a lower score.32 This pattern 
of incremental reform continued in the 2010 survey with 10 countries improving their performance, 
though 6 others received a lower grade for tax expenditure reporting than in the 2008 survey.33 Burton 
and Stewart provide abundant examples and sources to show how specific developing and emerging 
countries have begun reporting data, often quite recently. 34  The impetus for such reforms is likely 
different in each country but Western influences of some kind are often readily apparent. In some cases 
international agencies or experts have pointedly recommended that a country should do more to disclose 
and analyze its use of tax expenditures.35
                                                          
28 See Open Budget Questionnaire, question 45, available as of February 12, 2012, at 
http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/. 
 In others, domestic experts have invoked international models 
29 Mark Burton and Miranda Stewart, Promoting Budget Transparency Through Tax Expenditure Management: A 
Report on Country Experience for Civil Society Advocates (June 3, 2011), esp. 64-68. 
30 This diversity of political agendas is apparent from the range of testimonials by civil society advocates on the 
website of the Open Budget Index, available as of February 12, 2012, at http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-
do/open-budget-survey/advocacy/obsa/. 
31 OECD International Database of Budget Practices and Procedures (available as of February 12, 2012, at 
www.oecd.org/gov/budget/database), question 35. The non-OECD countries reporting on tax expenditures in their 
budget documents were Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Israel, Kenya, Latvia, Malawi, Mauritius, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Taiwan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe.  
32 See IBP Open Budget Index for 2006 and 2008, answers to question 45. The countries that improved their score 
were Argentina, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Jordan, Kenya, and Turkey. Only Papua New Guinea had a 
decline in its score.  
33 The ten improved countries were Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, 
Philippines, Russia, and Ukraine. The countries receiving a lower grade for tax expenditure reporting than on the 
2008 survey were Georgia, Ghana, India (down from ‘a’ to ‘b’ due to incomplete information about new tax 
expenditures in the budget year), Kenya, Peru, and Sri Lanka.  
34 Burton and Stewart, supra n. 29.  
35 See, e.g., Krever’s 2003 report on Mongolia’s corporate income tax, supra n. 26. See also International Monetary 
Fund, Experimental Report on Transparency Practices: Argentina (April 15, 1999), which commented that 
“published information on extrabudgetary funds, tax expenditures, and contingent liabilities is partial or unavailable’ 
(para. 11). Based on data in their Open Budget Index Questionnaires, both Argentina and Mongolia have increased 
their reporting of tax expenditures since 2006.  
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and standards to help make the case for reform.36
  
 India provides a prime example of a country that has 
embraced tax expenditure reporting in a significant way in recent years.  
III. Tax Expenditure Reporting in India, 2006-2011  
For decades, Indian tax policy experts have been calling for greater scrutiny of tax expenditures 
within their country. In 1974, not long after Stanley Surrey pioneered the concept in the U.S., Anand 
Bagchi wrote that “[n]o one familiar with the Indian tax scene would fail to perceive how urgently the 
Indian income tax needs [tax expenditure analysis]…”.37 A decade later Anand P. Gupta took up the 
cause arguing that the Indian tax system is “honeycombed with tax expenditures” and that “there is no 
proper system of accounting” for their costs.38
How much assistance does this tax expenditure provide? Does the activity benefiting from this 
tax expenditure continue to be high on the national agenda? Does the tax route continue to be the 
better way of assisting this activity? Has this tax expenditure been misused? …Has it added to the 
costs of tax administration and made the tax system more complex and irrational? Who has 
benefited from it? Has it encouraged extravagance or waste? …Has it been used to avoid or evade 
taxes? A periodical review along these lines would help in removing tax expenditures which 
serve little purpose.
 Gupta laid out glaring examples of concessions that were 
outdated, ineffective, or prone to abuse by tax avoiders, and proposed a serious review based on the 
following questions:  
39
A series of government-appointed tax reform commissions returned to this theme repeatedly 
through the 1990’s and early 2000’s.
 
40 In 2002 the Kelkar Task Force Report on Direct Taxes decried 
what it famously called the “exemption raj”, arguing that overuse of tax incentives was distorting 
economic behavior, eroding revenues, draining administrative resources, and promoting corruption and 
abuse. 41  The Task Force concluded that tax concessions are “not an efficient way of 
achieving…developmental objectives” and recommended broadening the tax base to finance a higher 
level of direct expenditures on public goods “particularly in the areas of health, education and other social 
infrastructure”.42 Indian scholars also published several studies around this time criticizing the country’s 
continued reliance on a complex web of exemptions and tax holidays in the face of abundant evidence of 
misuse and other active harms to the fairness and efficiency of the tax system.43
The passage of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (“FRBM”) in 2003 
contributed to the momentum for tax expenditure reporting.
  
44
                                                          
36 See, e.g., M. Golam Mortaza and Lutfunnahar Begum, ‘Tax Expenditures in Bangladesh: An Introductory 
Analysis’ (Policy Analysis Unit, Bangladesh Bank, 2006), which draws heavily on IMF and World Bank literature 
in advocating that Bangladesh should improve its tracking and reporting of tax expenditures.  
 While the FRBM does not require tax 
37 ‘Efficacy of Tax Incentives: “Tax Expenditure Analysis” and its Relevance for India’ 9:24 Economic and 
Political Weekly 951(1974), 952. 
38 ‘Management of Tax Expenditures in India’ 19:47 Economic & Political Weekly M-122 (1984), M-122 and M-
127. 
39 Ibid., M-130. 
40 See the Reports of the Tax Reforms Committee headed by Raja Chelliah (1991-93), the Shome Committee, and the 
Kelkar Task Force on Direct Taxes (2002), as discussed in Amaresh Bagchi, R. Kavita Rao, and Bulbul Sen, 
‘Raising the Tax-Ratio by Reining in the “Tax Breaks:” An Agenda for Action,’ National Institute of Public Finance 
and Policy Working Paper No. 54 (December 2005), available, as of February 12, 2012, at 
http://www.nipfp.org.in/newweb/sites/default/files/wp05_nipfp_tr_038.pdf. 
41 Dr. Vijay L. Kelkar et al, Report of the Task Force on Direct Taxes (New Delhi: December 27, 2002), 11-12 and 
64-113, available as of February 12, 2012, at 
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/DTC%20Bill/kelkar%20direct%20taxes.pdf. 
42 Ibid., 12. 
43 See, e.g., Bagchi, Rao, and Sen, supra n. 40; same authors ‘Tax Breaks for the Small Scale Sector’ (May 2006); 
and M. Govinda Rao and R. Kavita Rao, ‘Trends and Issues in Tax Policy and Reform in India’ (October 2005).  
44 Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, No.39 of 2003, Gazette of India (2003). 
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expenditure reporting per se it sets out targets for deficit reduction and requires more generally that the 
central government “shall take suitable measures to ensure greater transparency in its fiscal operations in 
the public interest….”45
The Indian Ministry of Finance released its first tax expenditure report with the Union Budget of 
2006-07, providing estimates of the revenue cost of various concessions to corporations, cooperatives and 
individuals.
  
46 It also analyzed the gap between statutory and effective corporate tax rates and how the 
effective rate varied among larger and smaller corporations depending on the generosity of tax 
concessions available to them.47 This is notable because many OECD countries, including Canada, do not 
attempt any such distributive analysis in their tax expenditure reports but simply estimate the aggregate 
cost of each concession.48
A tax expenditure or a revenue foregone statement was laid before Parliament for the first time 
during Budget 2006-07…It was well received by all quarters and gave rise to constructive debates 
on the entire gamut of issues concerning fiscal policy. It also lent credence to the Government’s 
intention of bringing about transparency in the matter of tax policy and tax expenditures.
 The tax expenditure exercise was repeated in 2007-8 along with the following 
celebratory comment in the budget:  
49
The government’s third tax expenditure report, released with the 2008-09 budget, expanded the 
distributive analysis by comparing effective tax rates in different industrial sectors. It found that the 
corporate tax burden was higher on public companies than privately owned ones, and higher on the 
manufacturing sector than the service sector.
  
50
…the amount of revenue foregone continues to increase year after year. As a percentage of 
aggregate tax collection, revenue foregone remains high even though a declining trend is 
noticeable. This trend reflects the success of the tax reforms undertaken by the Government 
during the last four years. Moderate tax rates and base expansion are the two essential elements of 
such tax reforms.
 The report concluded with the following openly normative 
statement:  
51
The 2009-10 and 2010-11 Statements of Revenue Foregone have adopted a sterner and less self-
congratulatory tone:  
 
… As a percentage of aggregate tax collection, revenue foregone remains high and shows an 
increasing trend as far as Corporate Income-tax is considered for the financial year 2007-08. In 
case of indirect taxes the trend shows a significant increase for the financial year 2008-09 due to 
                                                          
45 Ibid, s.6. I am indebted to Dr. Pinaki Chakraborty of the National Institute for Public Finance and Policy for 
assistance in making this link.  
46 Receipts Budget, Annex 12, Tax Expenditure Under the Central Government Tax System, 2004-05, available as of 
February 12, 2012, at http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2006-07/rec/annex12.pdf.  
47 Ibid., tables 1 and 2. 
48 The Canadian Department of Finance Tax Expenditure Reports from 1995 to 2011 were available as of February 
12, 2012, at http://www.fin.gc.ca/purl/taxexp-eng.asp. In late 2011 the Parliamentary Budget Officer for the first 
time released tables showing the distribution of personal tax expenditures among income groups and provinces of 
Canada. See Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2011 Reference Tables for Tax Expenditure Distributional 
Analysis (Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, November 10, 2011) (data are for taxation year 2009), 
available as of February 12, 2012, at http://www.parl.gc.ca/PBO-
DPB/documents/2011_Reference_Tables_Note_EN.pdf. 
49 Union Budget 2007-08, Receipts Budget, Annex 12, Revenue foregone under the Central Tax System: Financial 
Years 2005-06 and 2006-07, 45. 
50 Union Budget 2008-09, Receipts Budget, Annex 12, Revenue foregone under the Central Tax System: Financial 
Years 2006-07 and 2007-08, 45-47.  
51 Ibid., at 58.  
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reduction in customs and excise duties. Therefore, it is necessary to reverse this trend to sustain 
the high tax buoyancy.52
Again, this commentary is strikingly more directive about policy than anything in the Canadian 
tax expenditure report, which generally provides only brief, anodyne statements about the government’s 
stated policy objectives for each relieving provision, and omits any comment on trends in the number or 
cost of tax concessions as a proportion of overall spending.
  
53  Exceptionally, where legislation or 
government undertakings require, the report may offer a closer analysis of a particular provision.54
Further, unlike the Indian tax expenditure report, the Canadian version is not delivered as part of 
the federal budget but as a free-standing document released at a different time of the year and with little 
fanfare on the Finance Department website. Burton and Stewart note that one possible rationale for 
releasing a tax expenditure report well in advance of the annual budget is to provide citizens and 
parliamentarians with information that can be considered in the context of pre-budget consultations and 
advocacy.
 
55 In Canada this would make sense if the tax expenditure report was coordinated with the 
government’s fall Economic and Fiscal Update which sets the stage for pre-budget consultations. 56 
However this is not the practice and the most recent report was released on January 9, 2012, following the 
conclusion of parliamentary budget consultations.57 While Canadian federal budgets generally include 
projected costs for any newly announced tax expenditures, the failure to treat the full report covering all 
tax expenditures as a budget document means that Canada does not meet OECD or IMF standards of best 
practice in this area. As reiterated by the OECD in 2010, “[o]ne basic standard of tax expenditure 
reporting is that data be included in the budget” as this facilitates the essential comparison with direct 
expenditure data.58
The value of India’s report in stimulating discussion and evaluation of tax subsidies seems 
incontestable. No doubt the methodology, coverage and findings of its report can be subjected to critical 
analysis and improvement as in any country. Indeed the most recent Open Budget Index has downgraded 
India from ‘a’ to ‘b’ on the quality of its reporting, citing a lack of complete information on new tax 
expenditures proposed in the current budget year.
 Nor has Canada participated to date in the Open Budget Survey of the IBP. In all these 
respects, the Indian record is superior.  
59
                                                          
52 Union Budget 2009-10, Receipts Budget, Annex 12, Revenue foregone under the Central Tax System: Financial 
Years 2007-08 and 2008-09, at 58. See also Union Budget 2010-11, Receipts Budget, Annex 12, Revenue foregone 
under the Central Tax System: Financial Years 2007-08 and 2008-09, at 57. 
 Nonetheless, compared to having no report and even 
compared to a country like Canada where tax expenditure reporting has a longer history, it is evident that 
India’s Finance Ministry has improved the transparency of India’s budget with this report and has 
generated new evidence to inform policy making, legislative debate, and civil society advocacy. While 
fully acknowledging these benefits, I suggest it would be wrong to conclude that all low and middle 
income countries should necessarily follow this same path, or even that India should necessarily continue 
its current efforts in the same form in future. In the balance of this chapter I will argue that in weighing 
53 See, e.g., Department of Finance Canada, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2011 (Her Majesty the Queen in 
Right of Canada, 2012), available as of February 12, 2012, at http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2011/taxexp11-
eng.pdf.  
54 See, e.g., the discussion of the public transit tax credit in the 2011 report, Ibid., 48. 
55 Burton and Stewart, supra n. 29, 26. 
56 Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2011,supra n. 53. The Fiscal and Economic Updates were available as of 
February 12, 2012, on the Department of Finance website at http://www.fin.gc.ca/access/statement-eng.asp.  
57 The House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance released its report on pre-budget consultations in 
December 2011: Pre-Budget Consultations 2011, available as of February 12, 2012, at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/CommitteeBusiness/CommitteeHome.aspx?Cmte=FINA&Language=E.  
58 Tax Expenditures in OECD Countries, supra n. 6, 45. 
59 International Budget Project, Open Budget Questionnaire, India September 2009, question 45, available as of 
February 12, 2012, at http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/India-
OBI2010QuestionnaireFinal.pdf.  
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the value of a tax expenditure report, developing countries should also consider certain implicit costs and 
risks involved in adopting a budgetary practice pioneered in high income countries.  
 
IV. Universalizing Tax Expenditure Analysis: Some Cautionary Notes 
In this Part, I suggest there is a need for more critical evaluation of tax expenditure reporting as a 
strategy for advancing development goals in particular countries. It is difficult to argue against 
transparency at a general level, and this is precisely the problem. Tax expenditure reporting is often 
recommended to developing countries in a way that suggests it is an unmitigated positive, with no 
downside risks or contingencies that depend on local circumstances. As a result there is very little space 
for governments to question the wisdom of this advice or offer reasons why they have chosen not to adopt 
tax expenditure reporting, without damaging their own credibility as nations that are committed to good 
governance. This universalism sits uneasily with the broader law and development literature which has 
cautioned against externally-driven reform efforts that are not attuned to local history and political 
economy. Trebilcock and Daniels make this point neatly: 
 
Optimal institutions generally, including legal institutions in particular, will often be importantly 
shaped by factors specific to given societies, including history, culture, political traditions and 
institutional culture. This in turn implies some degree of modesty on the part of the external 
community in promoting rule of law or other legal reforms in developing countries and 
correspondingly a larger role for ‘insiders’ with detailed local knowledge.60
 
 
Similar concerns have been voiced in studies of tax reform in developing countries. Richard Bird 
for example emphasized the folly of attempting to design one-size-fits-all tax policy for developing 
countries, arguing that “[t]o be relevant, policy recommendations need to be geared specifically to the 
prevailing circumstances and objectives of that country”.61 Further, Stewart and Jogarajan have written 
about the role of international experts and organizations in prescribing substantive tax reforms for 
developing countries and the difficulty of implementing prescriptions that do not enjoy domestic political 
support.62
It would be far too simplistic to suggest that transparency standards are always foisted on 
developing countries from outside. Domestic governments have varying degrees of autonomy to 
determine their own budget processes. In the case of India, as discussed in Part III, the Union 
government’s decision to publish a tax expenditure report followed a decades-long internal campaign by 
Indian tax policy experts. It was not simply a foreign idea brought to India by Western-dominated 
international financial institutions. In fact India has worked to insulate itself from many of the most 
coercive economic restructuring pressures those institutions have applied to other Global South countries. 
In particular, it has pointedly not borrowed from the IMF since the Asian Financial Crisis of the early 
1990s. Nonetheless, even in India it would also be wrong to ignore the influence of outside tax and 
governance expertise.  
 Based on these studies, we should also be skeptical about imposing a generic best practice 
relating to tax expenditure reporting that is based largely on the experience and tax policy norms of high 
income OECD countries.  
First, it is notable that in writing about tax expenditures in the 1970s and ‘80s, Indian 
commentators borrowed heavily from the writings of U.S. experts. More recently, tax reformers have also 
acknowledged the influence of international norms in setting the direction of domestic policy. Thus the 
Kelkar Task Force commented:  
In a world of increasingly mobile and frictionless international flow of capital, outward looking 
national governments soon realised that getting a share of competitive global capital necessitated 
                                                          
60 Supra note 3, 12. 
61 Richard M. Bird, Tax Policy and Economic Development (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 17.  
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keeping the tax rates low and tax rules simple – in line with global trends…At the beginning of 
the 21st century, some truths about taxation have become self-evident…if the objective is to have 
transparent, efficient and feasible tax administration, then the structure of all taxes should 
comprise common elements. These are low rates, few nominal rates, a broad base, few 
exemptions, few incentives, few surcharges, few temporary measures…63
In their bid to compete in global markets for investment and trade, Indian policy makers have also 
understood the value of receiving public praise from international agencies about India’s progress on 
economic reforms. In particular, the IMF’s Fiscal ROSC reports are used by investment analysts to guide 
investment location decisions, and by credit rating agencies in rating sovereign debt.
 
64 Formally speaking, 
these reports are prepared only at the request of a government and are published only with its permission. 
The Fiscal ROSC on India, from 2001, noted that while the Union Budget met many of the requirements 
of the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, “there is no information on tax expenditures…”65 
In the years following the Fiscal ROSC IMF papers continued to criticize India’s pervasive use of tax 
incentives and exemptions, arguing that they distort investment decisions, erode revenues, and constrain 
growth.66
Services and agriculture need to be brought into the tax net, and lower tax rates must be 
complemented with the elimination of exemptions. Exemptions doubled from 1996 to 2002/3.
 Similarly the World Bank’s 2003 report on India stated: 
67
Given these kinds of highly visible statements, the Indian government’s decision to embrace tax 
expenditure reporting should not be seen as entirely home grown but rather as a combined product of 
external and internal norms and politics. In other countries where international donors and agencies have 
more direct leverage, the potential disadvantages or risks of importing tax expenditure analysis may be 
greater.  
  
At least three such risks can be identified. The first is that advocates may overstate the 
effectiveness of tax expenditure reporting as a strategy either to improve policy or to strengthen 
democratic oversight of the budget. This might be seen as a relatively mild downside that does no active 
harm to the receiving country. However I argue it is more troubling in light of a second risk that with tax 
expenditure reporting, and particularly the identification of a benchmark norm, a country may also import 
ideas about what constitutes good tax policy. That is, it may function indirectly to expose countries to 
criticism for making tax policy choices that depart from received international standards. Finally, the 
production of tax expenditure reports consumes valuable staff time and energy. Given the challenges that 
many developing countries face to administer their budget and revenue collection processes, new 
demands should not be added on a mere hope that some benefit may flow. Each of these disadvantages or 
risks is elaborated below.  
 
1. Exaggerating the Potential of Tax Expenditure Reporting to Effect Change 
Surrey and other early tax expenditure theorists had high hopes that greater transparency would 
trigger more rational policy making. This same hope is evident in the recent literature calling on 
developing countries to adopt tax expenditure reporting, as reviewed above in Part II. What is less fully 
conveyed is how difficult it has proven to be in practice for OECD countries such as the US, Canada, and 
the United Kingdom to make lasting reductions in the number or size of their tax expenditures.68
                                                          
63 Kelkar Task Force on Direct Taxes, supra, n. 40, 67. 
 Often 
politically easier to pass into law than direct expenditures, they also tend to evade critical review and 
64 See Philipps and Stewart, supra note 18, 812-815. 
65 IMF Fiscal ROSC for India, 2001, para. 16. This gap has since been remedied, as discussed in Part III above. 
66 See, e.g., Hélène Poirson, The Tax System in India: Could Reform Spur Growth? (IMF Working Paper WP/06/93, 
2006), 15; and IMF Survey August 7, 2006 (Vol.35, No.15), 238. 
67 World Bank, India: Sustaining Reform, Reducing Poverty (July 14, 2003), 53. 
68 For a review of trends in 10 countries, see Tax Expenditures in OECD Countries, supra n. 6, Ch.4.  
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Recent tax reform debates in India demonstrate the challenges of effecting base-broadening tax 
reform. The draft Direct Tax Code of 2009 proposed significant changes to the personal income tax of the 
sort that would appeal to many OECD-style reformers. These included eliminating deductions for home 
mortgage interest and reducing special treatment for capital gains, while using the increased revenue to 
reduce the general tax rate.
 In making the case for transparency there is perhaps a natural tendency to 
focus on its potential benefits. What the advocates of tax expenditure reporting often understate however 
is the political barriers and costs to changing certain parts of the tax code that may be widely viewed as an 
entitlement or as supporting a culturally valued way of life, or that may be defended vigorously by narrow 
constituencies who benefit from concessions.  
70  After approximately a year of consultation in which the government 
reportedly received more than 1,600 representations, a 2010 reform proposal was released with a much 
scaled back vision.71 Home mortgage deductions and capital gains relief will remain largely as is, as will 
tax rates.72
If the 2009 proposals were in fact defeated in part by interest group lobbying, India certainly 
would not be alone in that experience. In Canada the 1967 report of the Carter Commission which 
proposed a move away from source-based taxation toward a comprehensive tax base met a similar set of 
compromises following intensive advocacy by the business, investment and tax professional 
communities.
  
73 The point in both cases is that the process of tax reform ultimately has little to do with 
what technocratic information is available to policy makers or the public, and much more to do with a 
society’s political economy at a particular historical juncture. This is a key reason why tax expenditure 
reporting in many OECD countries has not succeeded in containing the number or cost of these measures, 
and why Western tax scholars are now grappling with the question of what other institutional changes 
could be introduced to discipline the use of the tax system as a spending instrument.74
 
 Given that tax 
expenditure reporting is not a costless exercise, countries would be well advised to weigh the benefits and 
identify clear objectives and strategies for using a tax expenditure report to inform policy or public 
debate.  
2. Importing Tax Policy Ideas Through the Benchmark Norm  
The second concern is that in adopting tax expenditure analysis a government may implicitly 
endorse a set of assumptions about what its tax and broader fiscal system ideally should look like. A tax 
expenditure is by definition a deviation from normal or benchmark tax rules. Many of the classic writings 
and OECD prescriptions assume the broadest possible tax base as the norm, with fully neutral treatment 
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of different sectors, taxpayers, and forms of production and consumption. They also assume that tax-
based programs can and should be replaced by direct government spending if this will achieve the goals 
of the program more effectively and transparently. These background assumptions are acknowledged to 
represent an ideal model rather than practical reality even by OECD-based analysts. They may be even 
less appropriate in a low income country with a large impoverished population, highly uneven industrial 
development, and limited or non-existent public safety net. That is, tax concessions designed to protect 
basic consumption of the poor or to support particular development objectives may be more justified or at 
least harder to replace with direct spending programs in low income countries than in wealthy ones.  
This tension was captured for example in the reactions of one Indian commentator to the Kelkar 
reports. Economist and senior civil servant Madhav Godbole praised the Task Force’s recommendation 
that a rigorous cost-benefit analysis be applied to any proposed new tax expenditures.75
…there is no social security net in India unlike in a number of other countries. Drawing lessons 
from disparate countries on the important question of tax exemption for saving instruments and 
making them applicable to India may therefore be counter-productive. There is certainly room for 
rationalization of some of the existing incentives…but to go to the other extreme and abolish all 
incentives altogether, as suggested by the task force, is certainly neither warranted nor will it be 
in the national interest.
 He went on, 
however, to object to its proposed reduction of tax concessions for saving, educational expenses and 
medical expenses as overly harsh. With respect to the first of these he pointed out,  
76
Similarly, Joosung Jun defends generous tax expenditures in South Korea as the most rational tax 
structure for that country, not because they encourage desirable economic behaviours but because they 
make the tax burden more equal between workers in the formal and informal sectors, thereby stemming 
tax evasion and encouraging taxpayers to enter the formal economy.
 
77  He rejects the standard 
international prescription to eliminate tax preferences, arguing that their base-protection effects offset any 
revenue or efficiency costs which in his view are “overstated”.78
The need to define a benchmark that suits the domestic context does not go entirely unrecognized 
by Western-based experts. World Bank analyst Li Swift, for example, acknowledges that the benchmark 
norm may need “some modification…corresponding to specific economic conditions in transition and 
developing countries…”
  
79 Likewise there is an active debate among tax scholars in the West about 
whether developing countries should be discouraged outright from using tax incentives to promote 
investment and growth, or whether the main focus should be on better design of incentives to prevent 
abuse and achieve state goals more effectively.80 Yet these nuances are side-stepped in much of the 
literature that promotes tax expenditure reporting by developing countries, and a zero-incentive norm is 
implicitly or explicitly adopted as the universal ideal benchmark against which a tax system should be 
evaluated.81
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 Countries may also be drawn to a broad benchmark because it is the simplest to define. Doing 
so, however, may place domestic policy makers on the defensive when their tax systems are then 
76 Godbole, Ibid., 4886.  
77 Joosung Jun, ‘Korea’s Tax System: A Growth-Oriented Choice,’ in Roger H. Gordon, ed., Taxation in Developing 
Countries (Columbia University Press, 2010) 220, 245-246.  
78 Ibid, 245. 
79 Supra note 22, 19. 
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evaluated by these same outside agencies. In this way, without explicitly imposing any particular tax 
policy, it may impinge on a country’s policy autonomy.  
 
3. Increasing Administrative Burdens  
Tax expenditure reporting requires an investment of time by expert staff. While these costs may 
be negligible to a high income country with a large civil service, their significance for other countries 
should not be discounted. For example Li Swift cautions that “It takes at least two years to develop a 
basic tax database for initial estimating [of?] tax expenditures. Therefore, any development relating to tax 
database for this purpose must be planned and begin as soon as possible”.82 Many developing countries 
have only modest staff resources available to manage their budget processes.83 In a particular case, the 
preparation of tax expenditure reports may not be worth its opportunity costs. Case studies on tax reform 
and development have identified a list of other priority investments that countries should make in order to 
strengthen their tax systems, many of which focus on improving administrative capacity rather than 
analyzing or refining tax policy.84 As Richard Bird has underlined, tax administration challenges render 
many policy prescriptions for developing countries impractical.85
Strengthening tax administration may require investing in information technology and human 
capital through training and better pay to retain skilled staff. Further, tax personnel are increasingly called 
upon to participate in international fora where treaties, soft law norms, and strategies for countering tax 
avoidance and evasion are being negotiated or discussed.
  
86 Especially because developing countries have 
not yet attained an equal place at the table in global tax governance, it is important that they participate 
and make their perspectives heard wherever possible.87
 
 The leaders of finance departments and revenue 
agencies in developing countries will often have to make difficult choices about how best to deploy 
limited human and operational resources. In this context, it is not obvious that gathering, analyzing and 
reporting tax expenditure data provides the best value for money.  
V. Conclusion 
This chapter examines the rise of tax expenditure reporting in countries of the Global South, and 
particularly within India as an emergent economic power, and describes the sources of international and 
domestic expertise that have actively called for this type of reform. While recognizing the potential 
benefits of greater transparency, I also suggest that more critical reflection is needed about its potential 
risks and costs for particular countries. My critique extends the point made by other tax scholars, that 
generic reform prescriptions of international bodies may be poorly adapted to the local circumstances of 
developing countries, and may impinge on their political autonomy to set tax policy. As Allison 
Christians has written,  
[i]nternational tax policy formulation has almost exclusively been the purview of experts from 
developed countries, despite periodic efforts to achieve some measure of participation by less 
developed countries. As a result, the economic, social, and legal context of these less developed 
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countries may be too easily overlooked as international consensus evolves regarding the strategies 
nations should employ to raise revenues in the context of a global economy.88
Tax expenditure reports may fall into this trap. They may also be far less effective than hoped at 
stimulating policy change or improving transparency and oversight, as the experience of high income 
countries such as Canada shows. Moreover, tax expenditure reporting consumes resources which might 
be better deployed in some other fashion, like detecting avoidance, negotiating tax treaties, or smoothing 
compliance for taxpayers.  
  
As a regulatory norm transparency often avoids controversy and escapes critical analysis because 
it presents a relatively value neutral and non-interventionist approach to governance. For the same reasons 
it may appear to transcend local differences and provide a model for universal reform. There are good 
reasons to support greater transparency about tax expenditures. However, exactly what should be 
transparent, to what ends and for whose benefit are political questions that should be answered to some 
extent at the level of national budget institutions. This chapter has also identified the need for countries to 
analyze whether the potential benefits of tax expenditure reporting outweigh the costs to them. When 
developing countries do embark on tax expenditure reporting they are well advised to consider their own 
objectives, priorities and resources and to design the exercise to fit these.  
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